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ABSTRACT 
Monetary Union and European Unemployment 
In this paper we analyze the likely effects of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
on European unemployment. We start by describing the current unemployment 
situation in the European Union (EU). In SO doing, we try to assess the relative 
importance of European, national, and regional-wide shocks in driving national and 
regional unemployment rates, and also to estimate the degree of real wage rigidity 
across EU countries. We then discuss various factors which, in principle, may 
contribute towards explaining the high and persistent EU unemployment rates, 
focusing on several labour market institutions like collective bargaining, job security 
legislation and unemployment benetits. The tinal part of the paper analyses, in light 
of the above evidence, the likely impact of EMU on European unemployment in the 
short and medium-term. We conclude that while the presently high European 
unemployment rates should not preclude EMU from being established, the operation 
of the monetary union will be smoother and its net economic benetits larger if 
Member countries succeed in implementing those structural labour market reforms 
which are needed for unemployment to go to lower, more reasonable rates. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last two decades, Western European countries have moved forward along 
the route to economic integration. As a result, the European Union (EU) nowadays 
has expanded to fifteen Member States, and the creation of an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) is envisaged to take place before the end of the decade. 
During the same period. unemployment rates in many of these countries have 
increased from about 2-3% to two-digit figures. Although unemployment has 
decreased during expansions and increased during recessions, the average European 
unemployment rate within each cycle has continuously increased. Remarkably, this 
evolution of unemployment is not shared by other developed countries, like the US 
and Japan. 
In the current situation, persistent unemployment is the most important social and 
economic problem of EU countries, therefore putting national governments under 
pressure to fight unemployment precisely at the time when they are trying to 
establish an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by the end of the decade. Thus, 
the following questions are being raised: What effect will EMU have on 
unemployment? What can the Union do to decrease unemployment? Are structural 
reforms needed to ease the effects of the move to EMU on unemployment? Is it in 
the interest of countries with a high unemployment rate to take part in EMU as soon 
as they satislY the Maastricht convergence criteria, or should they wait until they 
succeed in bringing down unemployment? 
In order to address the above questions the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 
describes the current unemployment situation in the European Union and, in 
particular, highlights those stylised facts that must be taken into account when 
assessing the likely effects of Economic and Monetary Union on European 
unemployment. Section 3 discusses the various factors which, in principle, may 
contribute towards explaining the unemployment situation, making use of the 
traditional distinction between cyclical and structural unemployment. This section 
also reviews the economic impact of several labor market institutions with a specific 
European flavour, like collective bargaining, job security legislation and 
unemployment benefits. Following the description of the main stylised facts and the 
analysis of the causes of European unemployment, we tum in Section 4 to analysing 
the potential impact of EMU on European unemployment both during the transition 
period and once EMU is fully established. Regarding the transition, the main issue 
is what impact will the fulfilment of the Maastricht convergence criteria have on 
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European unemployment. In other words, will the pursuit of nominal convergence 
help or hinder achieving real convergence, as measured, for instance, by 
unemployment rates? As for the impact of EMU on unemployment once it is fully 
established, we examine what may be the consequences of abandoning the nominal 
exchange rate as a tool of macroeconomic adjustment over the shorter and the 
longer-run. Finally, Section 5 summarises the main conclusions and policy 
implications derived from the paper. 
2. UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE FACTS 
This section highlights those facts on European unemployment that must be taken 
into account when analysing the likely effects of Economic and Monetary Union'. 
We first consider whether EU countries are in different starting positions in the path 
to EMU as far as unemployment is concerned. We then decompose national and 
regional unemployment rates in different components to ascertain the importance of 
common shocks across EU countries in explaining the evolution of national and 
regional unemployment rates. 
2.1 A "common" unemployment problem? 
Most EU countries share a strikingly similar evolution of unemployment since the 
mid-seventies. Nevertheless, this evolution is rather unique when compared to the 
evolution of unemployment in countries like the US and Japan (see Figure I). In 
particular, while US unemployment has moved up and down around an unchanged 
trend rate of unemployment of 5-6%, and Japanese unemployment has remained at 
extremely low values close to 2%, European unemployment has gone from 2.5% in 
the early seventies above 10% nowadays. 
N concems the present situation, unemployment rates range from near 3% in 
Luxembourg to near 23% in Spain (see Figure 2). However, within this very broad 
range there are three relatively well-defined country groupings: 
, OEeD (1994a), chapter I, is a recent and comprehensive account of stylized 
facts on European unemployment. The survey by Bean (1994) also provides the most 
significant facts. 
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· a) the "low" unemployment countries (below or at 7%): Luxembourg, 
3%, Austria, 5.9%, the Netherlands, 6.5%, and Portugal, 7%; 
· b) the "high" unemployment countries (between 7 and 13%): Germany, 
8.2%, Great Britain, 8.7%, Sweden, 9.2%, Belgium, 9.4%, Denmark, 
1 0%, Greece, 10%, France, 1 1 .6%, and Italy, 1 2.2%; and 
· c) the "very high" unemployment countries ( 1 3% or above): Ireland, 
1 3%, Finland, 17.1%, and Spain, 22.7%. 
All in all, there are four countries in the "lower" unemployment group, eight 
countries in the "high" unemployment group, and three countries in the "very high 
unemployment group. Thus, although there are significant differences in 
unemployment situations across the Union, I l out of 1 5  countries share having either 
high or very high unemployment rates" '. 
With regard to the disinflationary effects of unemployment, increasing European 
unemployment was associated with falling inflation from 1975 up to 1 990, and with 
rather stable inflation thereafter. A similar development took place in the US in 
, Although there has been some dispersion in labour force growth across 
countries, it is the different evolution of employment which constitutes the main 
source of disparities in unemp10yment across these countries. However, participation 
rates (labor force as proportion of working popUlation, 15-64 years) range from about 
60%, in Spain, to about 85% in Denmark, with high unemployment countries having 
relatively low participation rates. This means that dispersion in employment 
performance across EU countries, measured by employment rates, is larger than the 
dispersion of unemployment rates. A noteworthy feature of employment creation in 
EU countries is that it has been mostly concentrated in the public sector of the 
economy. On the contrary, in the US and Japan, employment growth has been driven 
by the private sector (see OECD ( l994a), chart 2.2). 
, The incidence of unemployment across different population groups also varies 
across countries. Generally speaking, female unemployment and youth unemployment 
are relatively higher in Southern European countries, where these population groups 
account for a sizeable proportion of unemployment. However, in most countries there 
is a close relationship between the evolution of total unemployment and male adult 
(25-55) unemployment. The difference of the male adult unemployment rates 
between EU countries and the US is not as large as the difference of total 
unemployment, but both show similar patterns and evolve accordingly. 
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tenns of inflation but with a much less unfavourable unemployment perfonnance. 
This suggests that the unemployment rate at which inflation is stabilized (NAIRU or 
"natural" rate) is noticeably higher in EU countries than in the US, a fact confinned 
by the available empirical evidence. In sum, while there are undoubtedly ditTerences 
across European countries, most of them share the unfavourable characteristic of 
registering rather slow disinflationary etTects of high unemployment rates, which is 
suggestive of strong rigidities in the downward movement of wages and prices. 
Figure 3 shows the present situation as regards both unemployment and inflation in 
Member States, and highlights several issues. On the one hand, the very ditTerent 
starting position across countries as concerns the state of real and nominal 
divergences is exemplified by the fact that while only four countries have 
unemployment rates below the rate which is typically considered to be acceptable 
(7%), eleven countries have already achieved inflation rates of 3% or lower, thus 
coming close to what is typically understood as a reasonable degree of price stability. 
On the other hand, many of the European countries often referred to as the "core" 
have unemployment rates which are higher than in some countries often referred as 
being in the (geographic) "periphery" (e.g. Portugal). Thus, the typical notion of what 
is "core" and "periphery" does not seen to apply in a clear-cut manner when we talk 
of convergence both in real and nominal terms. 
2.2 European, national, and regional components of unemployment 
The previous paragraphs have illustrated that, in spite of some marked national 
ditTerences, most EU countries tend to have rather high rates of unemployment, and 
to exhibit a significant resistance of inflation to come down in the presence of such 
high unemployment rates. This suggests, in principle, that there is a non negligible 
common element in European unemployment. 
To assess the likely impact of Economic and Monetary Union on European 
unemployment, it is important to look at how important are European, national and 
regional forces in driving unemployment rates over time. This is so because 
depending on which of them is more important the implied costs of foregoing the 
nominal exchange rate as a tool for short-tenn macroeconomic stabilization will be 
lower or higher. For example, if all unemployment rates at the national and regional 
levels were to be driven by a common European component, then suppressing 
national currencies would not be costly. 
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There are several approaches at assessing the relative importance of the different 
components of unemployment. 
A descriptive approach consists in measuring the evolution of unemployment 
dispersion across either countries or regions. Regarding unemployment dispersion, 
the standard deviation of unemployment across across EU countries (including new 
member states)5 shows a continuous raise in unemployment dispersion since the 
mid-seventies up to the mid-eighties, a mild decrease since then until 1990, and a 
surge in dispersion in the early nineties (see Figure 4). However, the evolution of 
dispersion (and, in particular, its rise since 1990), is heavily influenced by the 
contribution of Spain, one of the very high unemployment countries. Namely, with 
almost 10% of the Union's labor force, the Spanish unemployment rate has become 
roughly double that of the EU since the mid-eighties, and has shot up rapidly in the 
early eighties and, again, in 1992-93. Thus, when Spain is excluded we observe an 
increase in unemployment dispersion of smaller magnitude up to 1981, and no 
significant trend since then. As regards to the regional dispersion of unemployment, 
we have computed a similar index at the EUROSTAT NUTS I level of desegregation. 
While availability restricts both the period and the number of countries that we can 
use to construct this measure6, a similar picture arises: there is no significant overall 
increase in the regional dispersion of unemployment, and it is only in the early 
nineties when it increases (and, as in the case of dispersion across countries, it is 
largely due to the contribution of Spanish regions). 
A second approach towards assessing the different evolutions in the unemployment 
performance of countries/regions is followed by recent studies focusing on the 
persistence of unemployment differentials across regions. These studies show that in 
the European Union this persistence is not substantially higher than in the US (see 
Blanchard and Katz (1992) for the US, and Decressin and Fatis (1995) for the EU). 
Given the higher inter-regional labor mobility existing in the US, this result may 
appear surprising, but it is explained by the relatively higher procyclical labour 
participation rate in EU countries, which counters the effects of lower inter-regional 
migration flows. There are, however, some European countries where regional 
, Weighted by the share of each country/region in the total labor force. 
6 From 1983 onwards, and excluding Portugal, Greece, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden. 
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unemployment differentials show a great deal of persistence: Spain (see Jimeno and 
BentoIiIa (1995), Italy (see Decressin and Fams (1995», and the UK (see Thomas 
(1993». 
Final1y, a more rigorous method for assessing the relative importance of different 
forces in explaining the evolution of nationaUregional unemployment rates consists 
in using econometric models to decompose shocks to unemployment in several 
components; namely, a corrunon component, and a nationaUregional specific 
component. Following this approach, we have estimated a small model for each of 
the Member States' (whose basic details are provided in Appendix I), which allows 
us to decompose the evolution of unemployment rates into the three above mentioned 
components -European, national and regional'. In order to surmnarise in a compact 
form the flavour of our results, Table I a presents the relative importance of 
European and national shocks in explaining the evolution of national unemployment 
rates in the European Union, and Table Ib  shows the relative importance of 
European, national and regional shocks in explaining the evolution of unemployment 
rates in the European regions. 
As can be seen in Table I a, during the 197 I -93 period, EU-wide unemployment 
shocks explain almost half the variance of EU Member countries' unemployment 
rates within a one year horizon. This proportion increases to 59%, 70%, 78% and 
83% after one, two, three and four years, respectively'. Thus, EU-wide innovations 
, Except for Luxembourg and for those countries in which regional data one not 
available for a long enough period. Data on national unemployment rates are for the 
1969-93 period. Data on regional unemployment are available from EUROST AT 
(REGIO databank) for the 1983-93 period for all countries with the exception of 
Greece, the Netherlands, Portugal and the new Member States. 
8 The identifYing assumptions have been made that region-specific shocks to 
unemployment have no effect on national nor European unemployment, and that· 
national -specific shocks to unemployment have no effect on European 
unemployment. Regional unemployment data are at the EUROST AT NUTS I level. 
9 This variance decomposition is somewhat robust to the inclusion of 
detenninistic trends, and stochastic trends in the specifiction of the unemployment 
process. We have estimated our model with no trends, a similar deterministic trend 
for all countries, a segmented trend in 1973, and in differences. In the text we report 
the results from the estimation of the specification with no trends (see Appendix I). 
The variance decompositions from the specifications which include detenninistic 
trends are very similar to the decompostion reported in the text. When the model is 
estimated in differences, EU aggregate shocks explain (on average) 41 % of the 
- \6 -
to unemployment seem to play a very important role even in the short-run'o As a 
reference poin� we have performed a similar analysis on the US states using 
unemployment rates for the 1976-90 period, recovering US-wide innovations and 
state-specific shocks to each state's unemployment rate. The resulting decomposition 
of vanance shows that US-wide shocks to unemployment explain, on average, 79% 
of the variance of the states' unemployment rates within the year, and between 
84-85% after one to five years. 
One has to be cautious when interpreting this decomposition of the variance of 
unemployment between European and country-specific shocks. Given the simplicity 
of the model and the length of the time series Qn unemployment, we cannot provide 
any structural interpretation of the European wide shocks. It could be argued that 
coordination of monetary policies within Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) is 
behind these shocks. However, the sample period does not exactly correspond to the 
period during which the ERM has been in effect. Furthermore, there are countries 
which joined the ERM only recently (like Spain) and whose unemployment rates are 
mainly driven by European-wide shocks. Alternatively, one can think that 
international trade and/or (biased) technological progress, combined with wage 
rigidities in the labour marke� have recently been the main sources of shocks to 
unemployment. EU countries are subject to international competition in a similar 
degree, technological progress is likely to spread simultaneously across these 
countries, and wage rigidities seem to be common across Europe. Thus, it could be 
argued that the European-wide shocks that we have identified are nothing but trade 
and productivity shocks. Although this may be a likely explanation of European 
unemployment, our results are not powerful enough to prove it right. Notice that we 
have estimated European-wide shocks allowing them to have different effects across 
countries. This means that the same shock rises unemployment more in some 
countries than in others. Had we restricted European-wide shocks to have symmetric 
vanance within the year, and 53.6%, 57.6%, 57.6% and 57.9%, after one, two, three 
and four years, respectively. These results are available upon request. 
10 Regarding the short-run effects of EU-wide innovations to unemploymen� 
there are three countries in which these innovations explain a relatively low 
proportion of vanance of their respective unemployment rates: Italy, Portugal and 
Sweden. At the other extreme, the UK, France and Belgium are the EU Member 
Countries where aggregate innovations explain a highest proportion of the vanance 
of national unemployment. 
-17-
unemployment effects across countries (the common shock increases unemp]oyment 
by the same amount in all the countries), we would have found that country-specific 
shocks explain a much higher proportion of the variance of unemployment (roughly 
75%). 
Regarding European regional unemployment rates, the results reported in Table I b 
suggest that region-specific shocks explain between 61 -65% of the variance of 
regional unemployment rates. Taking together the weight of EU-wide and regional 
specific shocks, it leaves only about 20% of the variance of regional unemployment 
rates to be explained by national shocks." 
Overall, taking the results in Tables l a  and Ib altogether, we conclude that there 
seems to be a very significant EU-wide component driving unemployment across EU 
countries. At the national level, this component explains more than half of the 
variance of movements in unemployment. At the regional level, region-specific 
shocks and EU-wide innovations to unemployment explain up to about 80% of the 
variance of regional unemployment rates, a similar proportion of the variance of 
national unemployment rates explained by EU-wide shocks at medium horizons. 
Moreover, the situation in the European Union regarding the relative importance of 
common and idyosincratic shocks in explaining national unemployment rates is 
similar to that of the United States. Finally, something else worth mentioning 
regarding Tables l a  and Ib is that the above findings seem to be true not just for the 
EU as a whole but also for most Member States. Thus, it is not possible to draw any 
clear distinction between the forces driving unemployment in the so-called "core" 
and "periphery" countries. In Section 4 of the paper we will analyze what these 
findings mean as concerns the likely impact of EMU on European unemployment. 
2.3. Real wage rigidity In the EU 
One relevant issue for explaining the magnitude and persistence of EU 
unemployment is the role played by real wage rigidities. As it is well-knoW!), the 
higher is the degree of real wage rigidity, the higher is the NAiRU and the 
smaller the impact of monetary and exchange rate policy on real variables, like 
" Denmark is the only exception to this general pattern. 
- 1 8 -
Table la. 
Proportion <in%) of the variance of national unemployment rates explained 
by innovations to the EU unemployment rate <a) 
Within the After 1 year After 2 After 3 After 4 years 
year years years 
Belgium 61 76 82 85 86 
Denmark 58 60 64 68 72 
Gennany 32 54 70 79 83 
Greece 36 48 59 68 75 
Spain 52 72 86 92 94 
France 65 80 87 91 94 
Ireland 46 60 72 80 85 
Italy 9 26 46 67 79 
Netherlands 48 62 73 80 83 
Austria 29 54 72 81 86 
Portugal 7 26 44 56 64 
Finland 60 62 64 67 65 
Sweden 13 IS 18 20 23 
United 72 85 90 93 94 
Kingdom 
European 45 59 70 78 83 
Union 
Note: (a) The % of the variance of national unemployment rates explained by innovations to the 
national rate itself (idyosincratic shocks) is 100 minus the figures shown in the Table. 
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unemployment. Thus, finding out how rigid are real wages in Europe is of interest 
for knowing several things: to what extent is European unemployment structural; and 
how likely is it that the loss of the nominal exchange rate -once in EMU- will 
influence European unemployment. In principle, the more rigid are. real wages, 
themore structural is unemployment and the less important is the loss of the nominal 
exchange rate for real macroeconomic performance. 
There have been numerous attempts at estimating the degree of real wage rigidity 
across countries. Some of the most often quoted estimates are in Layard, et. al. 
(1991), chapter 9. These estimates arise from the structural estimation of wage and 
price equations across OEeD countries, and are reproduced in Table 2a. However, 
structural estimation of this kind is sometimes critisized on identification grounds, 
and on the measurement of relevant regressors. 
Since the relevant issue is about the sources of shocks and their transmission on the 
labour market, an alternative empirical approach can provide interesting insights. 
This approach consist on the estimation of the dynamic responses of the main labour 
market variables after several types of shocks. This has been the route followed by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), among others, who identified the relative 
importance of supply and demand shocks in EU countries and the correlation of 
these shocks across countries. However, they did not investigate the transmission of 
shocks through labour market variables. 
To complement the empirical results of the two studies mentioned above, we pose 
a simple labour market model (which is a barebone version of Layard's et. al. (1991) 
model, as extended by Blanchard, 1990), and estimate it following the structural 
V AR approach, as in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993)" . Thus, the model of the 
labour market that underpins our measures of real wage rigidity in EU countries is 
composed of a labour demand equation, and a real wage equation, according to wich 
real wages depend on current and lagged unemployment. In this setup, real wage 
rigidity is defined as the increase in equilibrium unemployment which is needed to 
accomodate a permanent wage-push shock. Under the assumption of constant returns 
12 As it is usual in this type of exercises, the Lucas' critique is relevant. What 
we can learn is about the sources of shocks and their transmission before EMU is in 
place. Both the sources of the shocks and their transmission could likely change 
under EMU. In any case, the current dynamics of real wages and unemployment 
provide the starting point for EMU. 
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to scale and constant mark-up pricing, the initial response of unemployment to a 
transitory wage-push shock is determined by the response of real wages to current 
unemployment, while the mean lag of the adjustment path followed by 
unemployment after such a shock depends on the response of real wages to lagged 
unemployment (see Appendix 2). Thus, the impulse response function of 
unemployment to wage-push shocks can be used to compute an index of real wage 
rigidity. 
The results of this exercise are shown in Tables 2a and 2b, which distinghish two 
cases: real wages react to the level of current unemployment more than to the level 
of lagged unemployment, and real wages react to changes in unemployment 
(hysteresis). In the first case, unemployment follows a stationary process and we 
estimate a bivariate V AR composed of (the rate of growth of) real wages and the 
level of unemployment. In the second case, unemployment follows a process 
integrated of order one, and we estimate a bivariate V AR composed of (the rate of 
growth of) real wages and changes in unemployment". Our results show that the 
degree of real wage rigidity and of hysteresis is significantly higher in EU countries 
than either in the US or Japan. We discuss in Section 4 the implications of these 
empirical findings for the potential effects of EMU on unemployment. 
2.4 European unemployment: what do we know? 
We now take stock of the previous analysis and of our reading of the existing 
literature on European unemployment to draw some tentative conclusions which can 
be useful in analysing the potential impact of EMU on European unemployment. 
Firstly, while there has been some sensitivity of European unemployment to cyclical 
conditions in the last twenty years, there has been an increase in unemployment 
over the long-run which suggests the presence of deep structural causes. This has 
been confirmed by the available empirical evidence which, although far from 
conclusive, suggests that the long-term increase in actual unemployment rates 
has been accompanied in many instances by an increase in NAIRUs. If persistence 
" The later case is plausibly relevant for some EU countries since 1973, where 
the presence of a unit root in unemployment cannot be rejected. It is not, however, 
a case that fits the US and Japanese experience in this regard. However, we also 
report the results of the US and Japan, in this case, for the sake of completeness. 
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Table Zb 
VAR (A.(w-p) . .4u) 
Real Wage Rigidity 
Belgium 1.42 
!),,,un"" 1.10 
f= 1.58 
Germany 1.48 
""'''''' 1.68 
Italy 1.00 
Netherl""" 1.52 
Spain 1.94 
UK 1.16 
Austria 0.85 
Finland 1.11 
Sweden 1.41 
European Union· 1.39 
USA 0.73 
J.".. 0.89 
• As in Table 2a 
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mechanisms are important enough, this sbUctural nature of European unemployment 
is nevertheless compatible with both supply and demand shocks having an impact 
on NAIRUs.Secondly, the rather high unemployment in the European Union relative 
to the US and Japan is mainly the result of a fall in the outflow rate from 
unemployment to employment, rather than the result of an increase in the inflow rate 
from employment into unemployment (see Layard et. al. (1991) and OECD ( I  994a)). 
As a consequence, the average duration of unemployment spells in EU countries is 
now much higher than it was in the early seventies, while in the US it has not 
changed significantlyl'. Furthermore, for a given vacancy rate, unemployment rates 
in EU countries are higher than they used to be. In other words, the Beveridge Curve 
has shifted outwards in most EU countries at least until 1985, although since then 
there seems to be no further shiftl'. 
Thirdly, as regards the size and characteristics of national unemployment problems 
-a key issue in discussions of real convergence-, it is far from clear that a neat 
distinction can be made between central or "core" EU countries and those in the 
(geographic) "periphery". 
Fourthly, unemployment dispersion across EU countries and regions increased during 
the seventies and early eighties, but excluding outliers (mainly, Spain), there has 
been no further increase in unemployment dispersion after the mid-eighties. In 
14 However, the increase in EU long-teon unemployment (unemployed who have 
spent at least one year without a job) took place in the late seventies and early 
eighties and has remained fairly constant since then (with two exceptions, Ireland 
and Italy, where it has increased). Since unemployment in the EU is mainly the 
result of a fall in the outflow rate to employment, there is a high correlation between 
total unemployment rates and long-teon unemployment rates. Thus, not sUIl'risingly, 
long-teon unemployment is specially high in Ireland and Spain (despite the fact that 
the high incidence of fixed-teon employment in Spain has significantly increased 
workers flows in and out of unemployment since 1987). 
I' The Okun curve (the relationship between the unemployment rate and the 
capacity utilization rate) shows a similar pattern. Instead, in the US, there are no 
significant outward shifts either in the Beveridge or Okun curves (if anything, 
inwards). In other non-EU countries an increase in vacancies but not in 
unemployment has been registered. The shifts of the Beveridge and Okun curves are 
illustrative not only of the nature of the shocks affecting the economy but also of the 
degree of mismatch between labor demand and supply, and of changes in social 
protection (see Blanchard and Diamond (1992)). Therefore, the EU experience 
suggests that, up to the mid eighties, either the matching efficiency of EU economies 
has decreased, or the social protection system has improved, leading to changes 
either in reservation wages or in the search intensity of the unemployed, or both. 
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addition. it seems that the evolution of national unemployment rates is driven to a 
significant extent by COIIUIlOn European forces. The uniformly higher unemployment 
rates in European countries, their persistence, and broadly similar evolution suggest 
that the underlying causes behind European unemployment are to a significant extent 
common to all Member States, and therefore that policies oriented towards reducing 
European unemployment should be rather similar across countries. Nevertheless, the 
intensity with which these policies is applied should be particularly high in Spain, 
Ireland and Finland, whose unemployment rates are the highest. 
Finally, real wage rigidity is relatively high in the European Union, and propagation 
mechanisms important enough for temporary shocks to have persistent effects on 
unemployment. Real product wages have increased more in the EU than in the US, 
but less than in Japan. The comparison between the EU and US experiences in this 
regard suggests the existence of a trade-off between real wage growth and 
unemployment following the occurrence of adverse supply shocks. In this light, there 
is well-<iocumented evidence of a productivity slowdown in both the US and Europe 
during the seventies and the eighties. Additionally, the adverse oil shocks of the late 
seventies and the early eighties represented a deterioration of the terms of trade. 
While in the US these developments caused a slowdown in real wage growth, in EU 
countries they translated into high unemployment. 
In sum, in spite of national differences in unemployment performance, EU countries 
share a persistent unemployment problem related to the relatively high incidence of 
long-term unemployment and the low effectiveness of unemployment at bringing 
down inflation. Furthermore, COIIUIlOn European forces seem to play an important 
role in driving national unemployment rates in Member States. However, we still 
need to explore what are the causes of the unfavourable unemployment performance 
in the European Union. This is the purpose of the next section of the paper. 
3. THE CAUSES OF EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
The plausible effects of EMU on unemployment cannot be grasped without a 
previous understanding of the causes of current European unemployment. In this 
regard, most models of the labor market distinguish between the natural rate of 
unemployment, which is the unemployment rate that would prevail in the long-run, 
and cyclical unemployment, which is the short-run unemployment caused by 
transitory shocks that hit the economy. Traditionally, the natural rate was thought to 
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correspond to frictional unemployment, which results iTom people moving between 
jobs in an economy working at full capacity and with a stable rate of inflation. 
Consequently, the natural rate of unemployment was thought to be independent of 
demand poJicies. and, to a first approximation. constant. However, the European 
unemployment experience suggests that the so-called natural rate of unemployment 
is anything but constant, that it should be better called structural or equilibrium 
unemployment, and that cyclical unemployment may become structural quite rapidly. 
The determinants of equilibrium unemployment, summarized in Figure 5, are thought 
to be related to factors affecting wage setting and price setting behaviour (see, for 
instance, Blanchard (1990), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) and Phelps (1994), 
while actual unemployment may be influenced by nominal shocks which induce price 
and wage surprises (see Appendix 3 for a more detailed presentation of the main 
conceptual determinants of unemployment). Regarding the determinants of 
equilibrium unemployment, most labour market models agree that all factors which 
induce wage pressure on the part of workers (e.g. union's strength, real wage 
aspirations, unemployment benefits, etc ... ) and price pressures on the part of firms 
(e.g. desired profit margins, etc.) adversely affect the level of equilibrium 
unemployment. 
As concerns the adjustment fTom actual unemployment to short and long-run 
equilibrium unemployment, this may be affected by some of the above mentioned 
variables that determine the equilibrium levels of unemployment. Moreover, there 
may be hysteretic effects, so that long-run equilibrium unemployment may depend 
on the path followed by actual unemployment. Two sources of hysteresis are usually 
mentioned. First, insiders' power in wage determination (resulting, for instance, from 
high firing costs) and union membership may result in target wages being dependent 
on the current levels of employment (see Blanchard and Summers (\986) and 
Lindbeck and Snower (\ 988)). Secondly, high unemployment usually leads to 
long-term unemployment. If either the long-term unemployed have lower job search 
intensity (because they become discouraged and diseniTanchised) or firms 
discriminate against them when hiring (because their skills depreciate), then the 
downward pressure exerted on wages by a given unemployment rate will be lower 
the higher is the proportion of long-term unemployment. 
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The conventional wisdom, based both on the stylized facts described in Section 2 
and on the theoretical arguments sketched above, is that any attempt at explaining 
European unemployment must account for the reasons of the rise in equilibrium 
unemployment. In principle. and as discussed above, there can be two alternative 
reasons for an increase in equilibrium unemployment: permanent shocks to the 
equilibrium unemployment rate; and transitory shocks which, because of the 
characteristics of the propagation mechanisms, have long-lasting effects on the 
equilibrium unemployment rate. 
There is some debate about the sources of the shocks driving European 
unemployment, and the relevance of the persistence hypothesis. Movements in the 
price of energy, in the terms of trade, in real interest rates, demand policy changes, 
and, recently, biased technical progress are often cited as the most relevant shocks 
that have hit EU economies in the past. As for the degree of persistence, the 
available econometric evidence is not particularly conclusive in distinguishing 
between the permanent shock hypothesis and the extreme version of the persistence 
hypothesis (ie., hysteresis)". 
There is nevertheless the presumption that labor market institutions affect both 
equilibrium unemployment and the speed of adjustment after transitory shocks. Thus, 
most economic policy packages aimed at reducing unemployment often refer to 
reforming labor market institutions like wage bargaining, job security legislation and 
the unemployment protection system. 
" There are two approaches at distinguishing between the permanent shock 
hypothesis and the hysteresis hypothesis. According to the first approach, while the 
pennanent shock hypothesis, in its extreme version, implies the existence of either 
a deterministic trend or a mean-shift in the stochastic process driving unemployment, 
the hysteresis hypothesis implies the existence of a unit root. The presence of unit 
roots in the stochastic processes followed by the unemployment rates of most EU 
countries cannot be rejected (see Elmeskov and MacFarlan (1 994» . However, given 
the number of observations in macroeconomic series, the power of unit root tests is 
low, and this evidence cannot thus be taken as supporting hysteresis versus a non 
hysteretic but slow adjustment process. According to the second approach, estimation 
of the structural equations contained in the model of the labor market can provide 
infonnation on the size of some interesting economic effects among the relevant 
variables. However, structural estimation is subject to some identification problems 
and, in any case, the usual estimation of aggregate dynamic macroeconomic wage 
relationships has mostly failed to prove the existence of hysteresis. Therefore, at this 
stage, there is no conclusive evidence on the actual relevance of hysteresis. 
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3.1 The role of labor market institotions 
The idea that labor market imperfections are the main cause of unemployment is a 
recurrent topic. In fact. the main lines of research on the determinants of equilibrium 
unemployment have focused on the effects of labor market institutions on both the 
level and the dynamics of unemployment. Nevertheless, as in the case of the sources 
of shocks to unemployment, different authors attach to them different degrees of 
importance when explaining EU unemployment. For instance, the well-known OECD 
lobs Study ( I  994a) is an in-depth comparative study of the causes of unemployment 
across OECD countries which advocates a complete deregulation of the labor market 
as the main measure to fight unemployment. On the other hand, the European 
Commission's paper (1993) just advocates very specific changes in the regulation of 
the labor market, and proposes an investment-led demand push and a more 
employment-intensive growth. There are also sceptics who claim that labor market 
institutions differ very widely across EU countries and, hence, that the similar 
unemployment evolution observed in these countries must be explained by something 
else (see, for instance, lunankar and Madsen ( 1995)). Finally, others authors 
recognize the specific nature of the labor market, and argue that a complete 
deregulation of the labor market is neither politically viable nor warranted by 
economic criteria. For them, the correct approach at refonning labor market 
institutions is to identify inefficiencies in the functioning of the labor market, starting 
from a recognition of the need to work within the parameters of the existing political 
economy framework, making marginal changes that work in the right direction 
(Alogoskoufis et. al. (1995)). In what follows, we explain our view on what is the 
impact of existing labor market institutions on European unemployment. 
3 . 1 . 1  Unions and Collective Bargaining 
The main differences in the wage determination process across EU countries arise 
from country-specific regulations on collective bargaining, and thus from the role 
played by unions in this process. However, besides specific rules, some common 
regularities can be found: while in the US union density and the proportion of 
workers covered by collective agreements are similar and low (about 1 5  % each), in 
EU countries union density is higher than in the US (with the exceptions of France 
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and Spain), and the coverage of collective bargaining IS much higher (about 
70-80%)". 
This disparity between union density and coverage of collective bargaining can be 
traced back to the fact that, while in the US collective agreements are reached within 
single-employer bargaining under a closed-shop system, in EU countries 
multi-employer bargaining with an open-shop system are most prevalent. 
Furthennore, while it is true that there are wide variations in collective bargaining 
practices across EU countries regarding levels of negotiation, and the degrees of 
coordination and synchronization among wage setters, it seems rather unlikely that 
these differences account for a large proportion of national intra-EU unemployment 
differentials. 
The mainstream approach to examining the macroeconomic implications of collective 
bargaining has focused on the concept of centralization. Most authors pay attention 
to the primary level at which wage negotiations take place (establishment, firms, 
sectors, nation- wide) and to the extent of coordination among wage setters. From 
this information, a (subjective) measure of the degree of centralization in collective 
bargaining is proposed and related to macroeconomic performance. From a 
theoretical point of view, there are several reasons why centralization of wage 
bargaining may reduce wage pressure and wage rigidity, thus favourably impinging 
on equilibrium unemployment and persistence. However, there 3Te other reasons by 
which single-employer firm-level bargaining may be preferred". As a result, there 
is no conclusive answer about the optimum level of centralization, and empirical 
analysis has not settled the issue either, mainly because empirical measures of 
centralization are not independent from researchers' perceptions of collective 
bargaining rules. 
The above notwithstanding, there is some consensus about what the worst collective 
bargaining procedures might be. In particular, when collective bargaining takes place 
at several levels, when sectoral agreements establish a layer of minimum wages, and 
when coordination among wage setters --finns and workers- is low, neither the gains 
from centralization nor the advantages of decentralization are achieved. Thus, under 
this scenario, equilibrium unemployment is unambiguously higher. 
11 See OECD ( 1994b), chapter 5. 
I' See Calmfors (1 994) for a survey, and Jimeno ( 1 993). 
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3 . 1 .2 Job Security 
There is a continuing debate on the effects of firing costs on employment. According 
to some, the main effect of firing costs is to reduce the variability of employment 
without affecting much the level of employment. The reason is that firing costs 
would reduce layoffs during recessions -since they make more costly to fire 
workers-, and would reduce hiring during expansions -since they increase the shadow 
cost of labor". 
However, this view is subject to criticism once we consider that, if recessions are not 
short-lived, the difficulties of firms to lay off workers during recessions may finally 
lead to their closing down, and thus to a more adverse effect on employment than 
under less costly firing conditions. Under this alternative interpretation, firing costs 
would negatively affect the average level of employment. In addition to the above, 
there are other (general equilibrium) unfavourable effects of firing costs on 
employment. Firstly, firing costs distort the allocation · of labor, so that efficiency 
may be negatively affected and the wages that employers can offer are lower. And 
secondly, they increase insiders' bargaining power, so that workers' target wages 
tend to be higher. As a result, employment is unambiguously reduced by firing costs. 
Firing costs arise from several sources, related to both the regulation on dismissal 
procedures and to the use of fixed term (temporary) contracts. Dismissals may be 
restricted by the requirement of notice period and administrative approval, severance 
payments, and the provisions for appeal against unfair dismissals. Fixed term 
employment, as an alternative to regular permanent employment, may be restricted 
by the nature of the work for which fixed term employees can be hired, minimum 
and maximum bounds on the length of the period of fixed term employment 
contracts, and provisions for renewal. 
As regards the evidence, most pundits have argued that firing costs are relative high 
in Continental Europe and that this contributes to explain unemployment differentials 
across countries. While it is quite complex to come out with a single measure of the 
severity of firing restrictions which could be used to establish comparisons across 
countries, there are some rankings of countries in this regard. The most recent and 
comprehensive of all of them is in OEeD ( l994a), chapter 6. According to it, there 
19 See Bentolila and Bertola ( 1990), and Bentolila and Saint-Paul ( 1994). 
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is some variation in the degree of strictness of firing regulations across EU countries, 
although regulations tend to be generally stricter in the EU than in non-EU countries. 
The exceptions are, on the one hand, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Denmark 
-which have the least strict employment legislation across EU countries. The OECD 
countries with the strictest employment protection legislation seem to be (in this 
order) Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Belgium. Within this group, there are both 
the countries with the highest (Spain) and lowest unemployment (Portugal, save 
Luxembourg) rates in the EU. Our interpretation of this evidence is that, while firing 
costs cannot explain by themselves observed unemployment differential across 
countries, since there are other factors that need to be taken into account, they 
nevertheless exert an adverse effect on unemployment in the EU. 
When attempting to reduce firing restrictions, instead of reducing them across the 
board for all permanent employment contracts, most EU countries have turned to 
partial liberalization strategies based on the allowance of fixed term employment 
contracts. With hindsight this has proven to be, in certain cases, an incorrect strategy 
since it has created artificial incentives for temporary contracts and has led to a 
segmentation of the labor market, with unfair social consequences and negative 
economic effects. The Spanish experience in this regard is quite remarkable. In late 
1984, fixed term employment was allowed. Nowadays, more than 30% of employees 
are under a fixed term employment contract, and the conversion rate of fixed term 
employees into permanent ones after their contract end is rather low (around 15%, 
according to some estimates). This duality of the labor market may have resulted in 
more wage rigidity (see Bentolila and Dolado (1 994) and Jimeno and Toharia 
(1 993a» , since permanent workers enjoy higher protection against dismissals, given 
the buffer of temporary employees, and wage negotiators mostly represent the 
interests of the former. It also has some negative effects on labor productivity, 
affecting effort choice and incentives for investing in firms' specific human capital 
(see Jimeno and Toharia (I 993b» . Moreover, it spuriously increases labor turnover 
rates since restrictions on the renewal of fixed tenn contracts result in the 
substitution of fixed term employees by others when contracts expire. And higher 
rotation, combined with generous unemployment benefits, produces an additional 
burden on the government's budget. 
In sum, insofar as firing costs are regarded as an obstacle to employment creation, 
the appropriate strategy would be to lower them for all kind of employment 
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contracts, avoiding the segmentation of employment between pennanent and 
fixed-tenn work,rs (as it happens in Spain). 
3.1.3 Unemployment Benefits 
While unemployment benefits are justified on social grounds, there are few doubts 
about their adverse impact on unemployment. Firstly, unemployment benefits 
increase the duration of unemployment spells by affecting search intensity 
(ambiguously) and the reservation wage of unemployed workers (unambiguously). 
And secondly, they make unemployment a less dramatic personal and social 
experience, thus affecting also employed workers' decision on effort choice and 
wage setting. Consequently, the unemployment benefit system is a determining factor 
of both equilibrium unemployment and unemployment persistence'". 
EU countries, where social cohesion is a social value, have generally opted for 
unemployment benefits systems with relatively high replacement ratios and relatively 
long duration of benefits'l. However, eligibility rules and the conditioning of 
benefits on search and on the willingness to work vary widely across Member States. 
As happens with other labor market institutions, it is quite difficult to obtain an 
objective measure of generosity to establish comparisons across countries. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that high-unemployment countries, where supervision 
and administration of the system to link benefits to search and willingness to work 
is very expensive, and/or perhaps unfeasible, may have no choice but to make 
eligibility harder and to reduce the duration of benefits. In contrast, 
low-unemployment countries may be able to keep adequate incentives by close 
supervision and conditional administration of benefits. 
'" For a recent very detailed empirical analysis of the impact of unemployment 
benefits see Bover et al. ( 1996). 
'I See OECD (1994a), chapter 8. 
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4. THE IMPACT OF EMU ON EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
The previous sections have outlined the �ost salient facts concerning European 
unemployment and put forward some hypothesis regarding the main causes driving 
both unemployment in Europe and national unemployment differentials. As a result 
of the analysis undertaken, it has been tentatively concluded that there are significant 
conunon roots to the existence of rather high unemployment rates in most Member 
States, and that these roots are, to a significant extent, of a structural nature. Of 
particular importance seems to be the pervasive role exerted by a number of labour 
market institutions, developed to extend the welfare state in the 60s and early 70s. 
Taking stock of the above analysis, this section tries to shed some light on how 
EMU might affect European unemployment. In order to answer this question, in what 
follows we distinguish between the impact of policies put in place to meet the 
convergence requirements set by the Maastricht Treaty to enter into EMU, and the 
impact of EMU itself once it is fully established. 
4.1 Unemployment in the transition to EMU 
4 . 1 . 1  The pursuit of convergence 
At present, unemployment in the EU stands at a rate close to 1 0%, which is 
considered to be higher than desirable on economic and social grounds and whose 
reduction is a top policy priority. At the same time, EU countries still do not meet 
all the convergence conditions set out in the Treaty to enter into EMU, and 
specifically the fiscal ones since most countries are far from eradicating excessive 
deficits. This is exemplified by the fact that, for the EU as a whole, budget deficits 
are close to 5% of GDP, and public debt levels close to 70% of GDP. The existence 
of significant budget deficits and debt levels requires taking revenue increasing 
and/or, preferably, expenditure reducing discretionary measures in order to meet the 
Maastricht fiscal convergence criteria and be able to establish the Union by 1 999, 
as envisaged in the Treaty. A most important question is therefore how will the 
needed fiscal consolidation measures affect European unemployment over the next 
few years. 
From a medium-term viewpoint, in SO far as the present size of structural budget 
deficits is too high, and insofar as its reduction is not carried out through tax 
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increases which raise the degree of "wage pressure", the process of fiscal 
consolidation should not adversely affect unemployment in the medium-term but 
quite the contrary. Indeed, lower budget deficits mean lower real interest rates, which 
enhance private capital fonnation and economic growth. 
From a short-term perspective, the traditional story is that a fiscal tightening leads 
to a reduction in the rate of expansion of aggregate demand which initially affects 
unemployment adversely. This is corroborated by most empirical macroeconometric 
models22. In addition, insofar as hysteresis mechanisms are at work, the impact on 
unemployment could persist for some time. While these effects are generally 
recognized as being valid to a first approximation, in practice the size of the 
shorter-term impact of fiscal consolidation on unemployment will vary across 
countries -given their different economic structures and present fiscal situations- and 
will also critically depend on which kind of measures are implemented, and on how 
they are implemented. 
Unfortunately, many of the existing empirical macromodels are not well suited to 
handle some of the key factors which will influence the final outcome regarding the 
impact of fiscal consolidation on the economy". In particular, as suggested by 
economic principles and as corroborated by experience and some research (Viiials, 
1 986, Giavazzi and Pagano, 1 990 and 1995, and Argimon, Gonzalez-Paramo and 
Roldan, 1995) a reduction of budget deficits based on permanent cuts in current 
government purchases may lead to lower short-term unemployment costs than if 
deficits are 'cut by raising taxes or by cutting public invesnnen!. The reason is that 
the reduction in aggregate demand derived from a cut in total public spending would 
be (at least partially) offset by the beneficial effects of the credible permanent 
reduction in current government purchases on private demand. Specifically, private 
consumption would expand as the public revises upwards its expectations of future 
disposable income, in the understanding that budgetary consolidation today reduces 
future taxes to service the debt. Private invesnnent would also increase once the 
public also contemplates a reduction in real long-term interest rates. [n the case of 
European countries, making substantial progress in fiscal consolidation would also 
help reduce the risk-premia implicit on interest rates through the reduction of both 
22 See, for instance, Hughes-Hallet and McAdam (1 996), Barrell et al. ( 1 995) and 
the discussion in Gros ( 1996). 
21 See Pisani-Ferri ( 1 996) and European Monetary Institute ( 1 996). 
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exchange risk and default risk. For countries with significant interest rate differentials 
at present, this 'interest rate reduction' effect may be all the more important. 
In sum, while the differing starting fiscal positions of Member States and their 
different macroeconomic structures suggest that the necessary fisca1 consolidation 
efforts may impact on their economies with differing intensities, the short-term costs 
of fiscal consolidation will be minimized (or even suppressed) if budgetary 
adjustments are carried out in an appropriate and credible fashion and, especially, if 
accompanied by structural reforms in labour markets to reduce the degree of real 
wage rigidity. Furthermore, credible progress along fiscal consolidation would 
contribute to improving the overall macroeconomic policy mix and thus to reducing 
the constraints that the pursuit of nominal stability places on national monetary 
policies, thus allowing lower real interest rates. Finally, given the unfavourable state 
of public finances in most European Union countries, the reduction of excessive 
budget deficits -besides iJ importance for the fulfilment of the Maastricht 
convergence conditions- is a desirable policy on its own right as it is a precondition 
for achieving sustainable economic growth. Even if short-term costs were to arise as 
a consequence of fiscal consolidation, this would be the necessary price to pay to 
improve growth potential. What Maastricht does is just to advance in time the 
implementation of the fiscal consolidation measures which, in any case, would have 
to be taken. 
A separate issue regarding unemployment during the tranSlt10n to EMU is the 
concern expressed in some circles that EMU may be rather difficult to run unless, 
previous to its establishment, countries achieve a much higher degree of convergence 
in unemployment rates. While it is true that the political acceptability of EMU and, 
specifically, of the future single European monetary policy, will be wider across 
Member States if their starting unemployment rates are relatively similar, we already 
indicated in Section 2 that a majority of EU countries already have converged 
-unfortunately- towards rather high unemployment rates (ie. the wrong kind of 
convergence). Furthermore, the desirability of EMU has much less to do with 
starting unemployment positions -which relate to the policies and shocks that 
happened in the past- than with the potential future impact of EMU on 
unemployment across the Union. This issue is addressed in Section 4.2. 
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4. 1 .2 Several speeds 
Another important issue regarding the macroeconomic impact of convergence 
policies during the transition is that the pursuit of convergence may become more 
difficult -and thus more costly in terms of unemployment- for those countries which 
are initially excluded from entering EMU in 1999. This risk, which is likely to be 
exacerbated if only a small set of countries enter EMU initially, will materialise 
insofar as financial markets tum their backs on the excluded countries's currencies. 
In this case, countries with derogation will suffer unwanted currency depreciations 
and higher risk premia that would also adversely affect inflation and the budget 
deficit, further complicating -and making more costly- the fulfilment of the 
convergence conditions. Moreover, these currency disruptions would also endanger 
the functioning of the Single Internal Market, which might adversely affect 
unemployment in the Union (ie. both in countries inside EMU and with derogation). 
Because it is crucial to avoid the above mentioned problems, it is of the outmost 
importance that an adequate global framework is established to enable countries with 
derogation to have a fair chance of meeting the convergence criteria and thus of 
joining EMU at a later stage". 
4.2 Unemployment in fuD EMU 
Ever since the beginning of the process of building a Monetary Union in Europe, 
there has been a very heated debate on its costs and benefits, and, in particular, of 
the consequences of relinquishing the use of the nominal exchange rate as an 
instrument for macroeconomic stabilization. In this regard, the main questions are: 
what will be the impact of EMU on European unemployment in the medium-term?; 
and, what will be the impact of EMU on European unemployment in the 
shorter-term? . 
4.2.1 The medium-term 
As regards the first question, the conceptual model of the labour market 
underpinning the analysis of Section 3 of the paper has rather clear implications 
regarding the main determinants of unemployment in the medium-term. In particular, 
unemployment will tend to be high if labour market institutions contribute to 
24 See, for example, Viiials (1996) for a discussion of these issues. 
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generating sustained wage pressures, and if there are sustained price pressures 
resulting from insufficient competition in product markets, low total factor 
productivity and a high cost of capital (see the theoretical labour market model in 
Appendix 3). Thus, the key question to ask is how will EMU affect the main 
detenninants of unemployment over the medium term. 
As a first rough approximation, it can be said that since establishing a monetary 
union is equivalent to having a different monetary policy regime -where the nominal 
exchange rate is no longer variable- and since monetary policy ought to be neutral 
over the medium-term, EMU should have no effect on unemployment over prolonged 
horizons. However, insofar as EMU leads not only to a different monetary policy 
regime but also to a more stable economic policy regime, this may also contribute 
to paving the way for lowering unemployment. For instance if, as a consequence of 
the monetary and the budgetary guidelines included in the Treaty, countries follow 
sounder and more stable economic policies. this will contribute to permanently 
lowering the cost of capital which would help investment, growth and unemployment 
(see, for example, Andres and Hernando, 1 995). Moreover, to the extent that EMU 
enhances market integration through the consolidation of the Single Internal Market, 
this may well increase the degree of product market competition in the Union which 
will lower the medium-term rate of unemployment. Finally, the establishment of 
EMU may also have an impact insofar as the stronger degree of economic 
integration ends up imposing more discipline on wage setters even if it doesn't affect 
the current collective bargaining procedures (which, as stated in Section 3, are not 
conducive to low unemployment). Indeed, as pointed out by Calmfors ( 1994) and 
Danthine and Hunt (1994), as econorrties become more open and integrated, their 
labour market performance becomes less sensitive to changes in bargaining structure. 
The above notwithstanding, it has been claimed that when shocks are very persistent, 
there is no guarantee that the management of the common monetary policy -once in 
EMU- will be neutral in the long-run, as a result of hysteresis effects. Nevertheless, 
given the debate over the actual size of those effects, the empirical relevance of this 
caveat for the Union as a whole is unclear, although it may be of importance in 
specific countries (see, for example, Blanchard et al. (1995)). 
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4.2.2 The shorter-term 
While, as argued just above, EMU should not adversely affect the medium-term 
performance of unemployment but quite the contrary, there is nevertheless a heated 
debate both among academics and policy-makers about the potential impact of EMU 
on unemployment over shorter-term horizons (ie. following the occurrence of specific 
shocks) and, in particular, about the costs that would come from the loss of the 
nominal exchange rate as a tool for short-term macroeconomic adjustment. 
In principle, as is well-known from the literature on Optimal Currency Areas, the 
impact of EMU on the shorter-term evolution of unemployment would depend on the 
nature of the shocks hitting the economies of the Member States and on the 
existence of alternative tools for macroeconomic adjustment. These are discussed in 
what follows". 
(a) The nature of shocks 
The loss involved in not making use of the nominal exchange rate as an instrument 
for short-term macroeconomic adjustment will be, ceteris paribus, smaller when 
shocks require little movement of the real exchange rate to reestablish equilibrium. 
Normally, this tends to happen when shocks across the Union are symmetric rather 
than asymmetric or idiosyncratic. In what follows we define a shock as being 
"symmetric" when its effects are roughly similar across the Union, and thus no real 
exchange rate adjustment is required to restore equilibrium. 
In order to infer how symmetric shocks could be in EMU, the empirical evidence has 
generally looked at the present situation in the EU and has taken the United States 
as a standard for comparison. While the evidence is far from being uncontroversial 
(see Vinals, 1 994 and 1996 for recent summaries), the dominant conclusion seems 
to be that idiosyncratic shocks tend to be more frequent in the EU than in the US. 
Nevertheless, it is also typically found that shocks are rather similar between the US 
and the subset of EU countries which have traditionally maintained closer economic 
and monetary links with Germany. The implication seems to be that a narrow EMU 
" For some recent surveys on the costs (and benefits) of EMU see: European 
Commission (1990), De Grauwe (1992), Eichengreen (1992), Gros and Thygesen 
( 1992), Krugman (1992), Feldstein (1993), Masson and Taylor (1993), Goodhart 
( 1993), and Vinals ( 1994). 
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would work satisfactorily, but that a wider EMU will be ridden by asymmetric 
shocks and serious national imbalances26. 
In contrast to this rather pessimistic conclusion concerning the economic vi�bility of 
a wider EMU, the evidence presented in Tables la  and Ib earlier in the paper -based 
on the econometric model described in Appendix 1 - is more favourable regarding the 
real costs of EMU. In particular, the finding that the common EU-wide component 
explains between 59-70% of the variance of movements in national unemployment 
rates even over the shorter-tenn (1 to 2 years) is consistent with the interpretation 
that, in general, the costs in terms of macroeconomic stability of abandoning nominal 
exchange rate flexibility are likely to be rather limited. Furthermore, our results also 
suggest that region-specific shocks explain most of the variance of regional 
unemployment rates -with national innovations having relatively little effect-, and 
thus that what would be really costly for Europe is to give up the regional currencies 
(if there were any!) rather than national currencies. All in all, the above results 
suggest that to the extent that shocks to unemployment continue to be either common 
or regional shocks, there are no reasons for EMU -and not just a "narrow" but also 
a "wide" EMU- to worsen the unemployment situation over the shorter-term. 
Evidently, an unavoidable problem that arises when interpreting the above mentioned 
empirical results is that they are drawn from comparing the historical performance 
of a group of countries that have not yet formed a monetary union with that of US 
regions, which have been long-standing members of a union. In short, the analysis 
could be biased because it might be the case that certain panems of behaviour now 
observed in the EU would tend to evolve towards those in the US as economic and 
monetary integration advanced. 
Consider the case of financial and monetary policy shocks. At present, these are 
country-specific shocks which result from imperfectly coordinated national monetary 
policies, currency substitution and exchange rate movements. This source of 
asymmetries would disappear instantaneously once EMU were formed and the single 
monetary policy implemented. Estimates by the European Commission (1990) and 
by Canzoneri, Valles and Viiials ( 1996) indicate that this effect is likely to be 
significant. As regards the real side, the main issue for concern is whether the 
deepening of economic and monetary integration wi11 be associated with a tendency 
16 See, for example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1 993). 
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towards productive diversification or specialisation in the EU. As Kenen (1969) 
argued years ago, the more diversified the industrial structure of countries is, the 
more likely it is that "industry-wide" shocks do not translate into "country-wide" 
shocks. In this respect, there are two opposing forces to be considered. On the one 
hand, since most intra-EU trade takes the form of "intra-industry" trade, this implies 
that Member States exchange very similar goods. Thus, foreseeable, deeper 
integration may contribute to further diversifying national production structures 
within the EU, lessening the role of asymmetric or "country-wide" shocks. On the 
other hand, work by Krugman (1 993) suggests that the EU could move in the 
direction of the US, with higher regional specialisation. Indeed, the existence of 
increasing returns to scale and "thick-market" externalities could lead to a regional 
concentration of production, thus making "industry-wide" shocks "region-wide" 
shocks as well. 
While we think that the point made by Krugman regarding the tendency towards 
regional specialisation as monetary integration proceeds is, in principle, a very 
important one, Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) have recently questioned the empirical 
validity of the supposedly more specialised regional productive structure in the US. 
Indeed, the above authors find that once total output is considered -and not just 
industrial output- it is no longer the case that the US is regionally more specialised 
than the European Union. In addition, even if there were a tendency in EMU towards 
regional specialisation rather than diversification, regional and national specialisation 
need not be the same thing. In particular, even if a given industry concentrates on 
a given geographical region, such region might very well spread across several 
countries. In that case, "industry-wide" and "region-wide" shocks may coincide but 
diverge from "country-wide" shocks. 
From the above discussion, we would draw the conclusion that it is likely that 
common, European-wide symmetric shocks will prevail in EMU. Nevertheless, and 
to be on the safe side, since real asymmetric shocks may still happen from time to 
time -and since they could be big- it is important that adjustment mechanisms are 
found to deal with them in EMU. This will be of particular importance in those 
countries with relatively more differentiated production and trade structures. 
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(b) The role of alternative mechanisms in adjusting to asymmetric shocks 
Among the adjustment mechanisms available to cope with real asynunetric shocks 
in a future EMU -labour mobility, fiscal policy and relative wage flexibility-, it is 
unlikely that labour mobility will play an important role since the numerous 
historical, cultural and linguistic differences across European countries consritute a 
formidable barrier to international migration. Furthermore, the Treaty of Maastricht 
grants only a limited role to national fiscal policies to cushion the impact of real 
asynunetric shocks. But what about relarive wages? 
When shocks have asynunetric effects across countries, a movement of the real 
exchange is required to restore macroeconomic equilibrium and avoid adverse effects 
on unemployment. If relarive wages were to adjust costlessly, they would induce a 
prompt re-equilibrating response of the real exchange rate and there would be no loss 
rrom forgoing the present degree of nominal exchange rate flexibility. Unfortunately, 
both the evidence presented in Secrions 2-3 of the paper and experience show that 
in EU economies structural rigidities in national labour markets make wages respond 
quite slowly to worsening economic conditions, and thus that unemployment tends 
to persist. 
While wages may not be flexible enough nowadays in the EU to cope with 
asynunetric shocks, it may be expected -on the basis of our discussion in Section 3-
that EMU itself might reinforce the degree of wage flexibility in so far as the 
absence of residual exchange rate flexibility improves the behaviour of wage setters. 
While accepring that EMU may improve the degree of competition in labour markets 
over the medium-run -as previously discussed-, we are not very optimistic on the 
actual magnitude of this effect over the shorter-run. In this regard, the recent 
experience of the ERM tends to suggest generally modest disciplinary effects on 
narional labour markets. In addirion, the recent experience in Germany following 
unification suggests that there may even be a perverse "wage catching-up" effect 
which, at least inirially, undermines downward flexibility. Consequently, restoring 
a higher degree of wage (and price) flexibility in EU countries is likely to require 
both a firm and balanced anri-inflarionary macroeconomic policy stance, and the 
implementation of wide-ranging supply-side policies aimed at improving the 
workings of labour (and goods) markets; for instance, by reforming job security 
legislation and unemployment benefits systems (and also by improving competition 
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in services sectors). If such policies are pursued -and the sooner the better- EMU 
will amplify their beneficial effects on wage (and price) flexibility. 
Let us assume for a moment, however, that the necessary structural reform policies 
do not take place. How costly is EMU then likely to be over the short-term in terms 
of unemployment for particular countries? 
In order to answer the above question, one must first ascertain how effective the 
nominal exchange rate actually is in facilitating real exchange rate adjustment in 
European countries. Clearly, we are not referring to a situation where the nominal 
exchange rate is used in an activist and systematic way by the authorities. As it is 
widely acknowledged, the systematic use of monetary or exchange rate policy will 
not be very effective in altering real variables once private agents take into account 
the behaviour of the authorities in their decisions, and may even lead to an 
inflationary bias. 
The question of the effectiveness of the nominal exchange rate in facilitating 
macroeconomic adjustment has often been approached from the point of view of how 
open the economy is, and of how rigid real wages are. In this respect, it has often 
been argued that the growing economic openness among EU countries within the 
Single Internal Market makes the use of the nominal exchange rate to restore or 
improve competitive positions increasingly less effective in economic terms, and 
increasingly more difficult in political terms". Furthermore, evidence of a 
significant degree of real wage rigidity in European labour markets -presented in 
Section 2.3- suggests that nominal exchange rate movements may be less effective 
than believed by some in moving the real exchange rate in the desired direction". 
And finally, and perhaps most importantly, the usefulness of the nominal exchange 
rate as a tool for macroeconomic adjustment is very questionable in a world of free 
capital movements, where foreign exchange markets are often subject to 
self-fulfilling speculative crises which take the exchange rate away from where 
fundamentals suggest it should be during prolonged periods". In these 
circumstances, there are serious reasons to doubt that the authorities can successfully 
" See, for example, Eichengreen and Ghironi (1 995) and Viiials (1 996). 
" See Bean (1 992). 
29 See Baxter and Stockman ( 1 993), Flood and Rose (1995) and Rose ( 1995). 
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resource to nominal exchange rate adjustments to restore macroeconomic balance in 
the presence of real asymmetric shocks. 
In a recent paper, Canzoneri, Valles and Viiials (1996) empirically investigate 
whether European nominal exchange rates actual1y address macroeconomic 
imbalances, or rather, are basically driven by financial considerations which may or 
may not be related to such imbalances. The conclusion of the paper is that in many 
EU countries -both large and small, more or less open, and with different economic 
structures- nominal exchange rates do not seem to be acting like the efficient "shock 
absorber" described in the literature on Optimal Currency Areas. However, it must 
be taken into account that while these results apply to "average" shocks, they do not 
apply to those big real assymetric shocks which come, say, once in a decade and 
which may require an adjustment of nominal exchange rates. 
In sum, while it is most likely that EMU will not, in general, adversely affect 
European average unemployment nor national unemployment differentials given the 
likely dominance of symmetric shocks, it is nevertheless possible that some countries 
with more differentiated economic structures may suffer if and when sizable real 
asymmetric shocks take place, given the limited role of intra-European labour 
mobility and of national fiscal policies in restoring macroeconomic balance. This 
notwithstanding, it must also be recognized that the growing degree of integration 
among European economies within the Single Internal Market and the increasingly 
important role of financial disturbances in driving exchange rates would in any case 
make increasingly less effective in economic terms and more difficult in political 
tenns to resort to the nominal exchange rate as a tool for macroeconomic 
adjustments if EMU didn't take place. Consequently, the only way to successfully 
cope with important real -symmetric or asymmetric- shocks and to avoid their 
unwanted effects on unemployment -inside or outside of EMU- is by increasing the 
degree of relative price and wage flexibility through the reform of those regulations 
and institutions which prevent an adequate functioning of national goods and labour 
markets. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLiCA nONS 
This paper has reviewed what we believe are the most important features of the 
unemployment situation in the EU in order to examine how could the establishment 
of an Economic and Monetary Union affect European unemployment, and how can 
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the latter be best fought. The main conclusions and policy implication obtained from 
the paper can be summarized as follows: 
Firstly. although there are significant differences in unemployment situations across 
the European Union, most countries have in common rather high rates of 
unemployment and a significant resistance of inflation to come down in the presence 
of such high unemployment rates. The contrast between the persistently high and 
drifting European unemployment rates and the much lower and stable rates obselVed 
in the United States and Japan suggests that there is a non-negligible common 
element in European unemployment. This impression is confirmed by the empirical 
evidence provided in the paper, which shows that common European forces seem to 
have been very important in explaining the behaviour of national rates of 
unemployment in the last decades. Furthermore, it is not possible to draw a clear 
distinction between the so-called "core" and "periphery" countries as concerns the 
main determinants of national unemployment rates. 
Secondly, the very persistent nature of European unemployment over many years 
suggests that it is mostly of a "structural" rather than of a "cyclical" nature. While 
a high rate of structural unemployment can be, in principle, affected both by supply 
and demand shocks and policies, our discussion seems to suggest that several labour 
market institutions may have been responsible for the less than satisfactory 
performance of European labour markets, both by contributing to generate sustained 
wage pressures, and by slowing down the speed with which wage growth decelerates 
in the presence of worsening economic conditions. Among the labour markets 
institutions discussed three stand out: collective bargaining, job security legislation, 
and unemployment benefits systems. It is also important to bear in mind that cyclical 
unemployment may become structural, given the strong persistence mechanisms 
obselVed in European labour markets. 
Thirdly, the pursuit of the convergence criteria established in the Treaty of 
Maastricht for entering into EMU implies implementing sound economic policies 
which are desirable on their own right and which would need to be introduced even 
in the absence of EMU. What the Treaty does is just to advance in time those 
policies. Furthermore, such policies need not be inconsistent with making progress 
on the unemployment front. Namely, while in some cases there may be short-run 
costs in terms of unemployment, these ought to be more than offset by the long-term 
benefits obtained. Finally, short-term costs may be lessened -and sometimes even 
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eliminated- if convergence policies are credibly implemented and, where applicable, 
accompanied by structural reforms in national product and labour markets. 
Fourthly, as concerns the impact of EMU on European unemployment, our analysis 
suggests that in so far as EMU leads to more stable monetary and non-monetary 
policies and to a higher degree of economic integration, this might have, if anything, 
a favourable impact on unemployment performance across the Union in the 
medium-term. Neverthe1ess, since the size of these effects is uncertain, it is stressed 
that -quite apart from EMU- the fight against unemployment must necessarily 
involve removing the structural obstacles to the good functioning of national labour 
markets, and the sooner the better. 
We have also explored how EMU might affect unemployment performance over the 
shorter-term given the unavailability of the nominal exchange rate to restore 
macroeconomic balance. Our tentative conclusion is that the fears that an EMU 
comprising a relatively large number of European countries may result in higher 
unemployment and/or higher national unemployment differentials are grossly 
exaggerated for several reasons. On the one hand, as explained in the paper, common 
symmetric shocks are likely to prevail once in EMU; on the other hand, the 
increasing integration of European economies within the Single Internal Market, their 
relatively high degree of real wage rigidity, and the presence of self-fulfilling 
speculative elements in foreign exchange markets, suggest that, in any case, it will 
be increasingly less effective in economic terms and more difficult in political terms 
to use nominal exchange flexibility in a macroeconomically stabilising fashion. This 
notwithstanding, it must be recognized that in those countries with more 
differentiated economic structures, and thus more likely to be exposed to real 
asymmetric shocks, EMU membership should be accompanied by structural reforms 
designed to improve the degree of relative wage flexibility so as to avoid future 
problems. These problems might be, in addition, all the more important if prevailing 
labour market institutions increase the persistence of the effects of those shocks. 
Fifthly, while we do not find justified that unemployment convergence should 
become an additional explicit or implicit requirement for entrance into EMU -as 
sometimes demanded by some- it is quite clear that countries with badly functioning 
labour markets, in addition to having worse growth and unemployment performance, 
will have more difficulties in meeting the nominal convergence criteria established 
in the Treaty since wage and price inflation will be stickier in a downward direction. 
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As a result, it can be said that the convergence criteria in the Treaty already take into 
account, to some extent, the concerns of those who worry about starting EMU with 
wide unemployment differentials, and thus that no explicit or implicit amendment to 
the criteria should be made for this reason. 
Finally, although there is a significant common European element in the national 
unemployment situations of Member States, policies to reduce unemployment are 
-and are likely to remain- mainly the responsibility of the national authorities. 
Nevertheless, European wide institutions can and should play a role in ensuring an 
adequate coordination of national efforts to fight unemployment within the 
framework already established to move towards EMU. As we have argued 
throughout the paper, the pursuit of nominal convergence needs not be incompatible 
with furthering real convergence if the coordinated implementation of sound 
monetary and fiscal policies, aimed towards achieving nominal stability, is 
accompanied by the introduction of appropriate structural reforms. In this regard, the 
further deregulation and liberalization of non-traded goods and services sectors 
-when necessary-, and the redesign oflabour market institutions -such as job security 
provisions and unemployment benefits schemes- should be among the top priorities. 
To conclude, high European unemployment is a most important problem which -with 
or without EMU- must be fought directly by removing its structural roots. 
Furthermore, while having unemployment rates around 10% should not preclude 
EMU from being established, the operation of the monetary union will be smoother 
and its net economic benefits larger if European countries succeed in implementing 
those structural reforms which are needed for unemployment to go to lower, more 
reasonable rates. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Europe�u, national, and regional components of unemployment 
rates in EU countries 
The decomposition of unemployment rates in EU countries and regions is based upon 
the following recursive model: 
u/EU = OW + A,(L)u1EU + E;u 
u/ = &' + A/(L)u, Ell + B/(L)u,' + e: 
u,u = SU + A,u(L)u,w + B,u(L)u,' + C,u(L)u,u U + E, 
(A \ . I )  
where t/s are constants, uElJ, u', UU are, respectively. the EU average unemployment 
rate, the unemployment rate of country I, and the unemployment rate of region J in 
country I; A(.), B(.), and C(.) are polynomials in the lag operator L (with A,(O) 
= B,(O) = C,(O) = 0), and E are unemployment shocks. Under this model, 
nation-specific shocks have no effects at the EU level, and region-specific shocks 
have no effects at the national level. 
Since the system is recursive, and we have different sample sizes for national and 
regional unemployment rates, we estimate the first two equations to decompose 
shocks to national unemployment into an EU component and a nation-specific 
component. The decomposition of shocks to regional unemployment rates is based 
on the estimation of the three-equation system on a the panel of EUROST AT 
NUTSI regions for each country, controlling for regional fixed effects, and imposing 
the constraint that the coefficients of the third equation in A 1 . 1 .  are the same across 
regions within the same country. The results in the text arise from the estimation of 
the system (AI.\) for each of the EU Member States (except for Luxembourg, and 
for countries in which regional data are not available during a long enough period). 
Data on national unemployment rates are for the 1969-93 period. Data on regional 
unemployment are available from EUROST A T (REGIO databank) for the 1983-93 
period (except for the New Member Countries, Greece, Portugal and the 
Netherlands). 
Note that this recursive model is a simplification of the following three dimensional 
Vector Autoregression (V AR): 
x, = D(L)x, + v,; D(O) = 0 (A 1 .2) 
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with Xl = (UEU. Ul• uD) and VI are innovations to unemployment . We have also 
estimated this V AR and recovered aggregate, national and regional shocks to 
unemployment under the identifying assumptions that both the contemporaneous 
effects of national shocks on the EU average unemployment rate and that the 
contemporaneous effects of regional shocks on national unemployment rates are nil. 
Under this maintained hypothesis, we cannot reject the (overidentitying) restrictions 
imposed on the recursive model (A l . l).  
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APPENDIX 2 
Real Wage Rigidity in EU Countries: An index based on the impulse 
response of unemployment to wage push shocks 
As noted in the text, the degree of real wage rigidity in the EU member countries 
is a crutial determinant of both the costs and benefits of EMU. It is often argued that 
European countries show a relatively high degree of real wage rigidity (when 
compared to the US, for instance) and, at the same time, noticeable nominal wage 
flexibiltiy (see Layatrd et. aI., 1991, and Bean, 1994). This combination produces 
short-lasting effects of nominal shocks and long-lasting effects of real shocks. The 
costs of a full EMU are decreasing in the degree of nominal flexibility and 
increasing in the degree of real wage rigidity. Hence, it is aimportant to assess the 
magnitude of real wage rigidity across these countries. 
Following the theoretical model of Appendix 3, we can write a wage and a 
(long-run) price equation. Assuming constant mark-up pricing, prices (in logs) are 
given by: 
p-w=m+z 
where p is prices, w is (nominal) wages, m is the mark-up and z are shocks assumed 
to follow a 1(1) process, and, therefore, innovations in z have permanent effects on 
real wages. Wages are negatively related to unemployment, as in: 
w-p=-c(u-hu.J + z" 
where u is the unemployment rate, c and h are positive parameters, and z"" are shocks 
to the wage equation when h<l .  A measure of real wage rigidity is the inverse of 
c(l-h). The higher c is, the less rigid real wages are; the higher h is, the more rigid 
real wages are. Combining these two equations yields that unemployment is given 
by 
u=m/c +hu.,+(z"+z)1c 
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Now suppose that shocks to the price-setting equation are mostly of a 
"technological" nature with permanent effects on real wages (z;-e' ). Shocks to the 
wage equation includes both technological shocks and (stationary) wage pushllabour 
supply shocks, so that zW;e'+e-. Then, 
m e -U = _ + h u.l + _  
C C 
m - h j  W 
+ E e-j 
c(l -h) JJJ c 
Thus, unemployment is stationary and its initial response to wage pushllabour supply 
shocks is greater the more rigid real wages are. The mean lag of the response to 
unemployment (h/(J-h)) is increasing in h. 
If h ;J, unemployment follows a random walk with drift, and its short-run and 
long-run responses to wage pushllabour supply shocks are decreasing in c. This 
simple model suggests that the degree of real wage rigidity is related to some 
characteristics the impulse-response of unemployment to wage pushllabour supply 
shocks, which are easily identified. In both cases considered (h<1 and h;/) real 
wages are 1(1) and wage pushllabour supply shocks have no long run effects on the 
level of real wages. Thus, the empirical exercise to assess the degree of real wage 
rigidities across countries is very simple. When h<I, estimate a VAR composed by 
the growth rate of real wages and the (level of the) unemployment rate, and recover 
the impulse-response of unemployment to shocks which have no log-run effects on 
real wages. When h; J, estimate a V AR composed by the growth rate of real wages 
and the first difference of the unemployment rate, and recover the impulse-response 
of unemployment to the same kind of shocks. Note that the model above suggests 
that the other type of shocks recovered are technological shocks which increase real 
wages in the long run and do not affect unemployment. 
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APPENDIX 3 
A benchmark model of the labor market 
Most models of the labor market identify two unemployment components: the natural 
rate of unemployment (also called structural unemployment or equilibrium 
unemployment), which is the unemployment rate that would prevail in the long-run; 
and cyclical unemployment, which is the short-run unemployment caused by 
transitory shocks that hit the economy. There is a continuing debate on the 
determinants of equilibrium unemployment and the sources of cyclical 
unemployment. However, most macroeconomists share a rather conunon approach 
when modelling the labor market. 
Figure A 1 provides a simple representation of the labor market which can encompass 
most models of unemployment determination. Given technological constraints and 
a fixed stock of capital, there is a short-run price-setting equation (or inverted labor 
demand equation) which establishes a negative relationship between real wages and 
employment, I; (in logs), which depends on expected demand. The labor force is 
given by l' (in logs), SO that a perfectly competitive labor market will yield full 
employment and (log) real wages equal to (w-p)'. However, wage detennination is 
given by a wage-setting equation that because of several reasons (efficiency wages, 
union power and collective bargaining, etc.) establishes a positive relationship 
between real wages and employment, lW (also en logs). Assuming correct 
expectations, the resulting short-run equilibrium unemployment rate is given 
by 1 S - I;, ,and inflation will be constant. !<fisperceptions on aggregate demand 
make the actual unemployment rate, 1 S - I, be different from the short-run 
equilibrium unemployment rate, so that a cyclical unemployment component arises. 
In the long-run, since the stock of capital is endogenous, the price-setting equation 
is horizontal, I:'. , at a level that depends on the user cost of capital and on the rate 
of growth of total factor productivity (see Blanchard (1990)) and, under some 
conditions, on the degree of competition in product markets. If the latter variables 
are roughly constant, long-run equilibrium unemployment is mainly determined by 
the variables that shift the wage-setting curve; that is, basically the reservation wage 
and whatever factors may affect the desired markup of actual wages over reservation 
wages. 
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The dynamics of the adjustment from actual unemployment to short-run and long-run 
equilibrium unemployment can be very rich for two reasons. On the one hand, some 
of the variables that detennine the equilibrium levels of unemployment may also 
affect the speed of adjustment from one equilibrium to another. On the other hand, 
there may be hysteretic effects, so that long-run equilibrium unemployment may 
depend on the path followed by actual unemployment (in tenns of Figure AI, this 
means that the position, and, plausibly, the slope of the wage-setting and 
price-setting curves, IW and ls�, depend on the path followed by actual 
unemployment). 
Thus, the detenninants of equilibrium unemployment can be divided into three 
categories: 
a) Factors that influence wage-setting behaviour. In Layard's et. al. ( 1991 )  
story of the so-called battle of the markups, the position of the wage setting-equation 
depends on the target real wage (or "wage pressure"), while its slope is related to the 
degree of real wage rigidity. In particular, as the degrees of wage pressure and real 
wage rigidity increase, so does equilibrium unemployment. Additionally, Phelps' 
(1994) sbucturalist theory stresses the role of efficiency wage considerations, so that 
the position and slope of the wage-setting curve depend on the quitting and shirking 
behaviour of workers. This behaviour is mostly affected by the ratio of non-wage 
income to total income, so that changes in wealth, interest rates and government 
transfers are among the variables shifting the wage-setting curve. 
b) Factors that influence price-setting behaviour. While different variables 
may affect price setting, in the battle of the markup's story the employers' desired 
profit margin -which depends on the degree of competition in goods markets- is the 
main variable affecting the position of the labor demand curve. In the sbucturalist 
story, many other variables may play a role such as: productivity growth, 
productivity and supply shocks, asset and wealth shocks, interest rate shocks, tax and 
tariff distortions, and public expenditure shocks . 
. c) Hysteresis effects. They relate the long-run wage setting and labor demand loci 
to the path followed by actual unemployment. The main sources of hysteresis are 
insiders' power in wage detennination and long-tenn unemployment, which reduce 
the downward pressure exerted by unemployment on wages. Thus, shocks to actual 
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unemployment. which do not affect short-tenn equilibrium unemployment directly. 
may have pennanent effects on long-run unemployment"'. 
lO In econometric tenns. the stochastic process followed by unemployment has 
a unit root. 
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